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NOTES
Contribution and Antitrust Policy
Contribution I has suddenly become one of the most hotly debated issues in antitrust law.2 Until recently, courts did not compel
antitrust violators3 to contribute to the satisfaction of a judgment4
l. Contribution, according to the co=on law of torts, is defined as distribution of the
amount of damages sustained by the victim among the joint tortfeasors by requiring each to
"contribute" to the total damages assessed. Indemnification is a concept similar to, and often
confused with, contribution. Indemnification shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor to another who is deemed responsible for making the full payment. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601
F.2d 330,331 {7th Cir. 1979); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 50 (4th ed.
1971).
2. Prior to 1979, antitrust contribution was advocated only by an occasional law review
co=entator. See Corbett, Apportionment ofl)amages and Contribution Among Coconspirators
in Antitrust Treble Pamage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1962); Paul, Contribution and
Indemn!fication Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 67 (1972);
Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682 (1978). There has been a
flurry of recent co=entary on the issue. See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in
Private Actions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 779 (1979); Sellers, Contribution
in Antitrust l)amage Actions, 24 VILL. L. REV. 829 (1979); Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980); Recent Developments, Contribution Among Antitrust Pefendants, 33 VAND. L. REV. 979 (1980).
The Supreme Court will soon decide this issue. The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed without
published opinion a denial of contribution rights in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), qffg. 84 F.R.D. 40 {S.D. Tex. 1979). See 949 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Jan. 31, 1980) (stating that the unpublished Fifth Circuit per
curiam opinion relied on Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1979)). A petition for certiorari has been granted Sllb nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams
Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972).
3. Antitrust violations that injure private plaintiffs are torts, see Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Wainwright v.
Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280
F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Wash. 1968), and defendants who combine or conspire in causing plaintiff's injury are joint tortfeasors. See Corbett, Sllpra note 2, at 11 l. Courts have therefore
turned to the law of torts in analyzing the antitrust contribution issue. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
English co=on law denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors under the doctrine of
Merryweather v. Nixan, IOI Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). A mistaken interpretation of the
Merryweather doctrine led most American jurisdictions to deny contribution to both negligent
and intentional tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, S11pra note I, at § SO; Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Torrfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); Reath, Contribution Between
Persons Jointly Charged far Negligence - Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176
(1898). The co=on-law rule barring contribution has been modified by statute in most
states, see Note, Contribution Among Joint Tor(leasors, 12 GA. L. REV. 553 (1978), and several
uniform acts allowing contribution have been drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, e.g., UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT
(1939 & 1955 versions); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§§ 4-6.
Prior to 1979 few courts deviated from the rule of federal co=on law denying contribution. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952)
(contribution denied in maritime personal injury case); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.,
(1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying contribution to an antitrust de-
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against a fellow joint5 violator.6 In February 1979, however, the
Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty
Supply, Inc. 7 broke ranks with other courts and ruled that under
fendant); DiBenedetto v. United States, [1975-1] U.S. Tax Cas. 87,330, 87,331 (D.R.I. 1974)
(denying tax fraud defendant contribution); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines
Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denying contribution to an antitrust defendant). But see Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (narrowing
Halcyon and expanding admiralty rule which equally divides damages between culpable parties). A co=on-law right to contribution has been implied under the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1976), but only by referring to express provisions allowing contribution under certain other
sections of those Acts. See generally Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 1256. There are no provisions in the Sherman or Clayton Acts giving
antitrust defendants a right to contribution.
One recent co=entator has advanced the novel idea that some antitrust violations more
closely resemble breaches of quasi-contracts than torts, and that contract rather than tort contribution rules should be applied in those cases. See Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust
Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 695-96 (1978). This theory has been rejected by the only court
that has considered it. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d
897, 900 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. Antitrust contribution has been invariably sought in the context of a treble damages
action by a private plaintiff under Clayton Act§ 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). This Note therefore
focuses exclusively on contribution in private treble damages actions.
5. Defendants who combine to violate the antitrust laws and thereby injure a private plaintiff are jointly and severally liable for all damages sustained. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J., concurring); Wilson P. Abraham
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979); Wainwright v.
Kraflco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr.
Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
Because each violator is severally liable for all damages sustained by a private plaintiff, the
plaintiff need not sue all violators but may choose which of the conspirators he will name as
defendants. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 899 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1979); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d I, 8 (9th Cir. 1963), qffd
per curiam, 362 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Wainwright v. Kraflco
Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F.
Supp. 802, 804 (W.D. Wasl_l. 1968). Similarly, the government need not sue all possible conspirators in a civil antitrust suit, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 129
n.2 (1966), and need not name all conspirators in a criminal antitrust indictment, United States
v. Gasoline Retailers Assn., Inc., 285 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the
possible unfairness which may result from a plaintiffs power to choose which of several potential defendants he will sue, see text at notes 68-93 i'!fra.
6. Before Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979), six courts refused to grant contribution to antitrust defendants - two in dicta
and four in the holding of the decision. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614,616 (3d
Cir. 1960) (dictum denies right of contribution under federal co=on law); Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,993 (E.D. Pa), mod!fication denied, 84
F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (contribution against settling defendants denied); Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1977-2] Trade Cas. 72,860, 72,861 (D. Utah 1977) (federal antitrust laws held not to afford a contribution remedy), qffd, [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th
Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979); El Camino Glass
v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (contribution denied
to an unintentional antitrust violator); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671,678
n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (dicta denies antitrust contribution to intentional tortfeasors), qffd in part,
remanded in part, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson Freight Co. v. Baughman, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F.
Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (contribution against settling defendants denied).
7. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
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some circumstances an antitrust defendant would be entitled to contribution from joint violators. 8 The chorus of reaction to Professional
Beauty has been loud and dissonant. 9 Courts, Congress, and antitrust practitioners have proposed a wide range of alternative contribution rules. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Wilson P. Abraham
Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc. 10 denies contribution in
all cases; the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. 11 denies it to intentional violators. A bill proposed by
Senator Bayh12 authorizes contribution only in price-fixing cases,
wliile a statute pro{>osed by the Antitrust Section of the American
8. The Eighth Circuit ruled that contribution should be allowed where, in the discretion of
the district court after a consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case, fairness
between the parties requires it. 594 F.2d at 1185-86. The court did not rule that the defendant
in .Professional Beauty was entitled to contribution. It ruled only that contribution might be
appropriate, and remanded the case for a consideration of all the circumstances. 594 F.2d at
1186. As of yet, no antitrust defendant has received contribution in a reported federal case.
9. .Professional Beauty has also provoked confusion and uncertainty in antitrust settlement
negotiations. One district court in the Eighth Circuit has refused to approve an antitrust settlement that failed to release non-settling defendants from liability for the settling defendant's
actions. In Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., (1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 63,059 al
77,251 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter opinion), Chief District Judge Eisele refused to accept a proposed settlement with two of the defendants in an antitrust suit. Eisele ruled that, in view of
.Professional Beauty, an antitrust settlement must release non-settling defendants from liability
for the settling defendants' actions before it can be approved.
At least four settlements filed in the Ninth Circuit have attempted to protect settling defendants from subsequent contribution claims. The settlements, all filed in In re Cement and
Concrete Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. 296, No. Civ. 76-488A (D. Ariz. 1979), each include one
of two methods of insulating settling defendants from contribution liability. Two of the agreements provide that the plaintiff will satisfy any contribution judgments against settling defendants. See Settlement Agreement with New Pueblo Materials, Inc. (lodged Oct. 3, 1979) (copy
on file with the Michigan Law Review); Settlement Agreement with Phoenix Redi-Mix Co.
(lodged Oct. 1, 1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). In the other two agreements, the plaintiffs agreed to reduce their own judgment against the contribution claimants by
the amount of any contribution judgments against settling defendants. See Settlement Agreement with Columbia Building Materials, Inc. (lodged Sept. 19, 1979) (copy on file with the
Michigan Law Review); Settlement Agreement with River Cement Co. (lodged July 31, 1979)
(copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
10. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 608 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979). Two
district courts have dismissed antitrust contribution claims since the .Professional Beauty decision. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), qffd
without opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979) (see 949 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-9 (Jan. 31, 1980) for a statement that the Fifth Circuit in affirming relied on Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979)), cert. granted sub
nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79972); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979) (contribution claim
against settling defendants denied when filed nearly nine years after original complaint filed).
In the Ampicillin decision, the court indicated only that contribution would be inappropriate in
the immediate case, not that contribution should be denied in all cases. 82 F.R.D. at 650
(citing Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979)).
11. (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068
(10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979).
12. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bayh Bill]. The full text of the
Bayh Bill, entitled "Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979," can be found at note 52 i'!fra.
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Bar Association would allow contribution in all private suits. 13
This Note examines the contribution controversy from an antitrust policy perspective. Part I summarizes the Professional Beauty,
Abraham Construction, and Olson Farms decisions and sketches the
major provisions of the Bayh Bill and the ABA Statute. Part II discusses four antitrust policy goals that figure prominently in both Circuit Court decisions and Congressional debate: fairness, deterrence,
promotion of settlement, and reduced complexity of litigation. Part
III argues that none of the rigid contribution rules proposed since
Professional Beauty achieves the optimal balance of these policy
goals. The Note concludes that a flexible rule permitting courts to
assess the propriety of contribution in each case would best resolve
this complex antitrust dilemma.

I.

POSITIONS IN THE CONTRIBUTION DEBATE

A.

Professional Beauty

The controversial Professional Beauty decision involved a dispute
between the two Minnesota distributors of La Maur, Inc. Professional Beauty Supply alleged that National Beauty Supply had
persuaded La Maur to terminate Professional's franchise. 14 Professional sued National for treble damages, claiming that National's demand upon the manufacturer for an exclusive dealership was an
attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15
National filed a third-party complaint 16 seeking contribution from
13. The Antitrust Section's proposed statute is contained in American Bar Association,
Report of The Section of Antitrust Law with Legislative Recommendation (Sept. 6, 1979), reprinted without Minority Report in 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-2 to
E-3 (Oct. 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]. The full text of the statute can be found
at note 60 infra.
14. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1181
(8th Cir. 1979). Before the suit was brought, Professional's franchise was renewed by La
Maur. 594 F.2d at 1185. The existence of a business relationship between La Maur and Professional at the time of the suit may explain why La Maur was not named as a defendant in the
original complaint. See text at notes 77-79 infra.
15. 594 F.2d at 1181. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to monopolize or
attempt to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 4 of the Clayton Act enables a private
plaintiff to bring a suit for treble damages if he is injured by a violation of the antitrust laws.
15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976).
16. A third-party complaint is filed before judgment against a person not previously party
to the action. It is the most common procedure for asserting rights to contribution when the
plaintiff has failed to name one of the joint antitrust violators as a defendant. See, e.g., Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); El
Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Contribution has also been sought in antitrust suits by (I) separate suit after judgment against the
violators not named in plaintiff's antitrust treble damages action, see Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), and by (2) cross-claim against
defendants who had previously settled with the plaintiff in the litigation, see Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,993 (E.D. Pa.), mod!ftcation denied,
84 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40
(S.D. Tex.), qffd without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom.
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La Maur for its part in the alleged wrongdoing. 17 The federal district court dismissed the third-party complaint, though Professional
had not objected to it, 18 and National appealed.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's contribution ruling.19 After deciding that federal law governed the antitrust contribution issue, 2° Circuit Judge Stephenson21 ruled that policies of
fairness and deterrence required a right to contribution in some antitrust cases. 22 The court sanctioned contribution despite contrary district court precedent23 and despite claims that such a rule would
Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972); In
re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979). Theorc:!tically, antitrust contribution could also be sought by a motion immediately following entry of judgment in the
plaintiffs suit or by way of counterclaim against a plaintiff who was also culpable for the
violation. See generally Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, supra note 2, at 818-21; Note, Contributions Under ihe Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 1256, 1283-86.
17. 594 F.2d at 1181. National sought contribution or indemnification under both federal
and Minnesota law. 594 F.2d at 1181. La Maur argued that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted and moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). 594 F.2d at 1181.
18. 594 F.2d at 1184.
.
19. 594 F.2d at 1186. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that no federal
right of indemnification existed under the antitrust laws. Indemnification was denied because
allowing an antitrust violator to shift the entire loss to another party would decrease antitrust
deterrence. Consistent with its contribution holding, the Court sought to ensure that "the loss
will be apportioned among the joint wrongdoers so that the deterrent effect of the judgment
will be felt by all culpable parties." 594 F.2d at 1186. This reasoning has already been endorsed by several courts. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330,334 (7th Cir. 1979) (no right
to indemnification where defendant violated section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78G)(b) (1976)); Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, (1979-2] Trade Cas.
78,493 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (rejecting antitrust settlement which would effectively permit indemnification).
20. 594 F.2d at 1182. Despite initial uncertainty, see, e.g., Corbett, supra note 2, at 119-28,
it is now universally agreed that federal rather than state law governs antitrust contribution
rights. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699, 79,700 n.5
(10th Cir. 1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., (1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,111
n.l (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp.
1339, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
21. Judge Stephenson wrote for himself and Circuit Judge Heany. District Judge Hanson,
sitting by designation, vigorously dissented. 594 F.2d at 1188.
22. The opinion is vague as to just what circumstances would warrant contribution in an
antitrust case. The remand to the district court for a consideration of "all of the circumstances," 594 F.2d at 1186, suggests that the district judge should consider in the instant case
the factors of fairness, deterrence, complexity, and encouragement of settlement, just as the
circuit court considered them in the abstract. Judge Stephenson referred to Justice White's
concurring opinion in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
146-47 (1968), for specific factors a district court should consider: (I) "relative responsibility
for originating, negotiating, and implementing the scheme"; (2) ''who might reasonably [be]
expected to profit from • . . the conduct making the scheme illegal"; (3) "whether one party
attempted to terminate the arrangement and encountered resistance or counter-measures from
the other"; and (4) ''who ultimately profited or suffered from the arrangement."
23. 594 F.2d at 1182-83. Judge Stephenson cited seven district court decisions, four expressly denying contribution, one denying it in dictum, and two denying it "arguably by impli•
cation." He dismissed all but the El Camino Glass and Sabre Shipping decisions because they
failed to give reasons for their contribution ruling. Sabre Shipping was questionable authority
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violate congressional intent,24 deter settlement,25 and further complicate litigation.26 The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether, upon consideration of all the circumstances,
National was entitled to pro rata27 contribution from La Maur. 28
"The deciding factor in our decision," wrote Judge Stephenson,
"is fairness between the parties."29 The Eighth Circuit identified two
elements of unfairness in the denial of contribution to National: the
placing of the entire loss upon National even though La Maur might
be equally responsible for plaintiff's damages, and the possibility
that only undue influence by La Maur upon Professional had prevented the manufacturer from being named as a defendant. 30
The Eighth Circuit also argued that denying contribution dilutes
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. Since the absence of contribution allows many antitrust violators to go "scot-free" while one is
held liable for all the damages, the court reasoned that "[t]his possibility of escaping all liability might cause many to be more willing
for denying contribution, claimed the Circuit Judge, because it relied heavily on a similar
ruling in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), a case
significantly narrowed by Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
See generally Note, Contribution in Private Antitmst Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 687-92
(1978). The Eighth Circuit agreed with much of the reasoning of El Camino Glass-, it differed
only on the relative weights to be assigned to arguments for and against antitrust contribution.
594 F.2d at 1183.
24. The Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass decisions argued that Congress intended to
deny contribution to antitrust violators. In part, they reasoned that the absence of express
contribution provisions in the antitrust laws, coupled with the presence of express contribution
provisions in certain sections of the securities laws, indicated congressional intent to prohibit
contribution in the former class of cases. See El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1]
Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President
Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Eighth
Circuit's rejection of this "congressional intent" rationale for denying contribution, and most
commentators would probably agree with its statement: "We do not . . . interpret this omission [of statutory contribution rights from the Sherman and Clayton Acts] as evidence that
Congress necessarily intended to deny contribution under the antitrust laws. . . . It is more
likely that this narrow question . . . never occurred to the drafters of the legislation." Wilson
P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979). See Note,
supra note 23, at 699-700. Since both the Eighth and Fifth Circuits rejected congressional
intent as a deciding factor in their contribution decisions, this Note will deal no further with
that issue.
25. 594 F.2d at 1184. See text at notes 117-33 i,!fra for a discussion of the settlement issue.
26. 594 F.2d at 1184-85. See text at notes 134-49 i,!fra for a discussion of the increased
complexity that allowing antitrust contribution might cause.
27. Contribution could be measured in a number of ways. As pro rata contribution is
usually defined, each violator contributes equally to any judgment returned against one, regardless of the violator's relative fault. See W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 50, at 310. Antitrust
contribution shares could also be measured according to comparative fault, percentage of
sales, or percentage of profits. See notes 170-72 i,!fra and accompanying text.
28. 594 F.2d at 1182. The circuit court also directed the district court to consider further
the pendent Minnesota state law claims for contribution and indemnity. 594 F.2d at 1187-88.
29. 594 F.2d at 1185.
30. 594 F.2d at 1185.
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... to engage in wrongful activity."31 Even intentional violators,
who were routinely denied contribution at common law, were to be
allowed contribution because of this deterrence argument. 32
Senior District Judge Hanson, sitting by designation, dissented
from the majority's contribution ruling. He argued that the policy of
deterrence did not support the majority's rule allowing contribution
because it was unclear whether the rule would deter or encourage
antitrust violations. 33 Noting that Professional's suit could succeed
only if National intentionally violated the law, Judge Hanson suggested that contribution among intentional antitrust violators would
be especially inappropriate. 34 The dissent-also claimed that allowing
contribution would intolerably increase confusion, delay, and complexity in antitrust suits, and would thereby chill plaintiffs' incentive
to bring private suits.35
B. Abraham Construction

Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc. 36

arose out of a conspiracy among New Orleans-area concrete manufacturers to raise and stabilize prices. In 1973 a grand jury indicted
four manufacturers, including Texas Industries, for violating section
I of the Sherman Act. Criminal prosecutions culminated in nolo
contendere pleas. In 1975 Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corporation brought a treble damages action against Texas Industries
alone, basing its claim on the same violation that was the subject of
the prior criminal suit. Texas Industries thereupon filed a thirdparty complaint against its three criminal codefendants, seeking contribution from them should it be found liable to Abraham. Bowing
to the weight of authority, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion by the third-party
defendants to dismiss the contribution claim. Judge Thornberry of
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, ruling that under no circum31. 594 F.2d at 1185. This reasoning contrasts sharply with that in Wilson P. Abraham
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979), as well as that in El
Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 ("the court believes that
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be increased by not permitting defendants to
redistribute the cost of an antitrust violation"). See text at notes 101-16 i'!fra for an analysis of
the deterrence debate.
32. 594 F.2d at 1186.
33. 594 F.2d at 1189-90.
34. 594 F.2d at 1188-89. But cf. Getter v. R. G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559 (S.D,
Iowa 1973) (implying a right of contribution under certain sections of the securities laws in
favor of an intentional violator). In Getter, Judge Hanson argued that an intentional tortfeasor
"should not be allowed to escape liability under the Securities Act by the fortuitous circumstance that he was not sued in the main cause of action. Ifhe is a joint-tortfeasor, he should be
held to contribution to facilitate enforcement of the obligations imposed by the Securities
Act." 366 F. Supp. at 569.
35. 594 F.2d at 1189-90.
36. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 608 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979).
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stances would contribution be available to antitrust violators in the
Fifth Circuit.37
The Abraham Construction decision rejected the Eighth Circuit's
conclusion that deterrence and fairness require contribution. The
court observed that "prevailing economic theory" indicates that denying contribution is more likely to deter anticompetitive conduct
than allowing it. 38 The Fifth Circuit minimized the unfairness of a
no-contribution rule, concluding that the threat of collusion39 or coercion40 posed by a no-contribution rule was insufficient to outbalance the advantages of a no-contribution rule, and was mitigated by
the possibility that a victim of collusion or coercion might have an
independent cause of action for relief. 41
The Fifth Circuit made it clear that its ruling barred contribution
even among unintentional violators. Judge Thornberry claimed that
allowing contribution to unintentional violators would reduce deterrence. 42 He dismissed as "problematic" the harshness that might result should unintentional violators be barred from contribution.
Circuit Judge Morgan dissented from the part of the Abraham Construction decision that denied contribution to unintentional antitrust
violators. He found it intolerable to force a defendant guilty of no
conscious wrongdoing to "bear total responsibility for the sins of
many." 43
C.

Olson Farms

In Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
created a hybrid contribution rule from the Professional Beauty and
Abraham Construction decisions. Five Utah egg distributors, including Olson Farms, had fixed the prices at which eggs were purchased
from producers. Fourteen producers singled out Olson Farms for an
37. Those aggrieved by the decision were instructed to tum to Congress for a statutory
remedy. 604 F.2d at 906.
38. 604 F.2d at 901 & n.8 (citing Note, supra note 23, at 702).
39. A rule barring contribution permits a plaintiff to "collude" with one of the potentially
liable parties and then to bring a suit against a different defendant. "Collusion" is loosely used
and rarely defined by the courts when contribution is at issue. See note 77 i,!fra and accompanying text.
40. Coercion is possible where contribution is barred because a plaintiff can threaten a
defendant who refuses to settle with the possibility of bearing the entire liability for a conspiracy alone. See text at notes 84-95 i,!fra.
41. 604 F.2d at 901-02. See text at note 83 i,!fra. The court also noted that Texas Industries did not allege any instance of coercion or collusion in the immediate litigation. 604 F.2d
at 901-02.
42. Judge Morgan took strong issue with this point. 604 F.2d at 907 (Morgan, J., dissenting). He has the better of this argument. See text at notes 107-09 i,!fra.
'
43. 604 F.2d at 908 (Morgan, J., dissenting). "I would, in the interest of fairness, award
contribution to a defendant whose liability is based solely on an unintentional violation of the
antitrust laws." 604 F.2d at 906-07 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
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antitrust suit,44 even though it had purchased only eleven percent of
the eggs involved.45 Olson Farms lost the suit and subsequently satisfied a $2,400,000 judgment, more than twenty-four times the damages directly attributable to its purchases.46 The district court
dismissed Olson Farms's separate suit seeking cont'ribution from its
coconspirators.47
Judge Miller, writing for the Tenth Circuit,48 affirmed the denial
of contribution rights. After a review of the policy arguments made
for and against contribution in the Professional Beauty majority and
dissenting opinions, the Tenth Circuit decided to wait for a clear signal from Congress before entering "such a complex policy thicket." 49
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth ruled that intentional antitrust violators such as Olson Farms were barred from asserting contribution
rights. Circuit Judge Holloway dissented, pointing out that "[t]here
are important reasons rooted in the antitrust laws for . . . allow[ing]
recovery by intentional tortfeasors."50
In dicta, the Tenth Circuit briefly mentioned that unintentional
violators might be excepted from its decision barring contribution.
With that single phrase and its accompanying footnote, the opinion
at least partially endorses Professional Beauty. 51 For the sake of unintentional violators the Tenth Circuit is apparently willing to
plunge into the policy thicket it avoided in the Olson Farms case.
44. Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. de11ied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
45. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699, 79,700 (10th Cir.
1979), reheari11g en ba11c gra111ed, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979).
46. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,700 n.4.
47. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., (1977-2] Trade Cas. 72,860, 72,861 (D. Utah
1977).
48. Judge Miller, of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, was sitting by
designation. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699, 79,699
(10th Cir. 1979).
49. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,704. The court specified four species of thorny issue within
the contribution "policy thicket": (1) For what type of conduct will contribution be allowed?
(2) How will contribution shares be calculated? (3) What effect will rights to contribution have
on settlements? and (4) By what procedures will defendants be able to assert contribution
claims?
50. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,706 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Holloway concurred in affirming the dismissal of the indemnity claim. (1979-2] Trade
Cas. at 79,708 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,704 & n.15. Footnote 15 of the opinion outlines how trial
judges are to exercise their discretionary power to grant contribution rights to unintentional
violators. First, where contribution is sought in a separate suit after judgment, account should
be taken of whether the party seeking contribution made a reasonable effort to bring joint
violators into the original suit through rules 13 (cross-claim and counterclaim) and 14 (thirdparty claim) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial judge may further examine the
factors listed by Justice White in Perma Life and cited in Professio11al Beauty. See note 22
supra. Finally, the court noted that exceptions for violators "may be squeezed out in the rare
'ad absurdarn' or 'shock the conscience' type case, but not where contribution might predictably tend to frustrate observance and enforcement of the antitrust laws."
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The Bayh Bi!/52

Senator Bayh's contribution bill, S. 1468, was Congress's first reaction to the Professional Beauty decision.53 The bill would amend
section 4 of the Clayton Act to grant contribution rights to all price:fixing54 antitrust defendants. According to the Judiciary Committee
52. See Bayh Bill, supra note 12. The text of S. 1468 is as follows:
A Bill To provide for contribution of damages attributable to an agreement by two or
more persons to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton

Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives ofthe United States ofAmerica
in Congress assembled, That the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by
inserting after section 4H the following new section:
"SEC. 41 (a) Two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages attributable
to an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act
may claim contribution among them according to the damages attributable to each such
person's sales or purchases of goods or services. A claim for contribution by such person
or persons against whom an action has been co=enced may be asserted by cross-claim,
counterclaim, third-party claim, or in a separate action, whether or not an action has been
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the persons from whom contribution is
sought.
"(b) A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received in
settlement by one of two or more persons subject to contribution under this section shall
not discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms expressly so provide. The
court shall reduce the claim of the person giving the release or covenant against other
persons subject to liability by the greatest of: (1) any amount stipulated by the release or
covenant, (2) the amount of consideration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages
attributable to the settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3)
above, actual damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of this Act.
"(c) A release or covenant, or an agreement which provides for a release or covenant,
entered into in good faith, relieves the recipient from liability to any other person for
contribution, with respect to the claim of the person giving the release or covenant, or
agreement, unless the settlement provided for in any such release, covenant, or agreement
is not consu=ated.
"(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the joint and several liability of any person
who enters into an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices.
"(e) This section shall apply only to actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act
co=enced after the date of enactment of this section."
53. The Bayh bill was first proposed as an amendment to S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), in May 1979. Hearings on the amendment were held in June. See Antitrust Equal
Eeforcement Act of1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and
Business Rights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]. The amendment was subsequently withdrawn and reintroduced as
a separate bill, which was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on July 31, 1979. See S.
REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The Bill now
awaits action on the Senate floor.
54. The Bill and the Senate Report fail to define price-fixing. This could be the source of
some confusion. The Supreme Court has recognized that price-fixing is essentially a term of
art attached to any of the variety of practices which are found to be per se illegal. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979). It is therefore
difficult to predict whether many practices, such as exchange of information among competitors, will be defined as price-fixing by the courts. See Posner, Ieformation and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1197 (1979). And in the
wake of the Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Catalano Inc. v. Target Sales Inc., 100 S.
Ct. 1925 (1980), it seems likely that the Court will broadly define the term price-fixing in the
future. See Nannes, A Price-Fixing Surprise, Per Se: Implications ofthe Catalano Case, NATL.
LJ., July 7, 1980, at 23, col 1.
It is also uncertain how the bill applies to vertical price-fixing. See 940 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-16 (Nov. 22, 1979) (statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Shenefield).
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report on the Bayh Bill, courts would remain free to grant or withhold contribution rights in non-price-fixing cases.55
Senator Bayh and other supporters of S. 1468 claim that its pri' mary purpose is to prevent coercion of settlements from small and
medium-sized corporate defendants.56 Novel provisions governing
contribution-share measurement and claim reduction are designed to
achieve this goal without deterring fair settlements. Each violator
contributes to the plaintiff's recovery according to the damages directly attributable to that violator's sales. 57 If the plaintiff settles
with one defendant, the court will reduce his claim against the remaining violators by treble the damages attributable to the settling
defendant's sales.58 To preserve the incentive to settle, the bill exempts settling defendants from liability for contribution. 59
E.

The ABA Statute 60

In reaction to the rapid progress of the Bayh Bill in the Senate,
the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association proposed its
55. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 12, 21. Many types of agreements that are not
price-fixing may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, including a wide variety of vertical
restraints imposed upon distributors by manufacturers. Joint violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act, such as that alleged in the Professional Beauty case, would also fall outside the
scope of the Bayh Bill. Although critics of the Bayh Bill claim it is therefore underinclusive,
see ABA Report, supra note 13, at 2, the Bill would probably cover the majority of cases in
which contribution is sought. Six of the eight cases which have so far raised the contribution
issue involved alleged price-fixing in violation of section 1, viz., Wilson P. Abraham Constr.
Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores
Inc., [1979-2) Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th
Cir. Dec. 27, 1979); Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc. [1979-1) Trade Cas. 77,993
(E.D. Pa.), modffecation denied, 84 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), qffd. without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3821)
(U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., (1977-1) Trade Cas.
72,110 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp.
1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
56. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at I; Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 3. Coercion of settlements is discussed at text accompanying notes 84-95 infra.
57. Where the conspiracy fixed prices at which goods or services were purchased,
purchases rather than sales are the basis for measuring damages.
58. See Bayh Bill, supra note 12, at 4I(b), reproduced al note 52 supra. The subsection
duplicates New York's contribution statute, which provides that a plaintiJrs recovery against
non-settling defendants shall be reduced by the greatest of (1) the consideration paid for the
settlement release, (2) the amount stipulated in the settlement agreement, or (3) the amount of
the released tortfeasors' equitable share of the damages. N.Y. GEN. Osuo. LAW§ 15-108(a)
(McKinney 1978).
59. See text accompanying notes 121-25 infra.
60. "A Statutory Proposal for Contribution," ABA Report, supra note 13, at E-2, E-3
[hereinafter cited as ABA STATUTE]. The full text of the proposed statute reads as follows:
Contribution Rights of J)ej"endanls.
"(a) In any action brought under section 4, 4A or 4C of the [Clayton] Act, if the
damages recoverable from any defendant were, in whole or in part, caused by the
wrongful acts or omissions of another, rights of contribution shall exist and be enforceable
in accordance with this section, and not otherwise.
"(b) Claims for contribution in antitrust actions may be asserted by the filing of a
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own broader and more detailed contribution statute. The ABA Statute would grant contribution rights to all defendants in private antitrust suits. The Antitrust Section argues that the need to prevent
unfairness by allowing contribution is just as great in non-pricefixing cases as in price-fixing cases.61
Other provisions of the ABA Statute resemble those of the Bayh
Bill. The proposed statute would bar contribution claims against settling defendants. 62 It would require a court to reduce the plaintiffs
claim against the remaining defendants by the amount of the contribution share otherwise chargeable to the settling defendant. 63 The
ABA Statute, however, measures contribution shares according to
the "relative responsibility" of each party,64 rather than according to
counter-claim, cross-claim or third party claim in the same action as that in respect of
which contribution rights are claimed, or in a separate action.
"(c) Claims for contribution will be barred unless they are filed (i) within one year of
the date of service of the original complaint giving rise to potential liability, or (ii) within
sixty (60) days after the claimant for contribution receives reasonable notice of his liability
or potential liability based in whole or in part upon damages caused by the wrongful acts
or omissions of another, whichever date occurs later. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
claims for contribution shall be barred unless they are filed within sixty (60) days after the
entry of final judgment by the district court awarding damages against a prospective
claimant for contribution.
"(d) Contribution rights may be claimed only against those persons for whose
wrongful acts or omissions plaintiff seeks to recover damages from one or more
defendants.
"(e) Contribution may not be obtained in favor of or against a person who, pursuant
to a settlement agreement with a plaintiff in the action in respect of which contribution
rights are claimed, has been released from potential liability for the underlying claim. To
avail itself of this paragraph, a settling defendant must advise the court and all other
defendants, in writing, of the existence of the settlement agreement within sixty (60) days
of its execution.
"(f) Following a settlement in the action in respect of which contribution rights are
claimed with less than all defendants, the plaintiff may, within sixty (60) days of the
settlement, elect to withdraw from the damage action all claims based upon the acts or
omissions of the settling person or persons. Failing such an election by plaintiff, the court
shall reduce any judgment by the amount for which each settling defendant would have
been liable for contribution had there been no settlement.
"(g) Contribution claims shall be determined by the court following the trial of the
action in respect of which contribution rights are claimed in accordance with the relative
responsibility of each party for the damages awarded in the main action which are subject
to contribution rights as provided herein.
"(h) Nothing in this section shall preclude two or more persons from agreeing to (i)
apportion their collective liability in some manner other than as specified in this section or
(ii) toll the automatic barring effect of paragraph (c).
"(i) This section shall apply only to actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act
commenced after the date of enactment of this section."
61. See ARA Report, supra note 13, at E-1.
A Minority Report, attached as an appendix to the ABA Report (but not reprinted with it
in 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. {BNA) E-1) [cited hereinafter as Minority Report),
claims that the proposed statute would frustrate settlements, lessen the deterrent effect of the
Sherman Act, and substantially complicate antitrust litigation (a copy of the Minority Report
is on file with the Michigan Law Review).
62. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§ (e). The statute also provides a statute of limitations
for contribution claims,§ (c), and by implication validates sharing agreements among defendants,§ (h).
63. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at § (f).
64. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at § (e).
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the "damages attributable to each . . . person's sales or purchases,"
as the Bayh Bill provides. 65
The circuit court opinions and statutes summarized above can be
ordered according to their liberality in creating contribution rights:
(1) Contribution rights mandated in all antitrust cases (ABA
Statute).
(2) Contribution rights mandated in price-fixing cases and
available at the courts' discretion in other cases (Bayh Bill). 66
(3) Contribution allowed at the district court's discretion in all
cases (Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty; Judge Holloway's dissent in Olson Farms).
(4) Contribution allowed at the district court's discretion for
unintentional violators and barred in all other cases (Tenth Circuit
in Olson Farms).
(5) Contribution barred in all cases (Fifth Circuit in Abraham
Construction; Judge Hanson's dissent in Professional Beauty).
The rational means to choose among these rules is to determine
which best promotes relevant antitrust policy goals.
II.

CONTRIBUTION AND THE CONFLICTING GOALS
OF ANTITRUST POLICY

The debate among courts and commentators over antitrust contribution revolves around four goals of antitrust policy: fairness, deterrence, promotion of settlement, and reduction of complexity of
litigation. Other antitrust reforms besides allowing contribution
would promote some of these same policy goals. Unfairness might
be reduced by holding a joint violator liable for only a portion of the
plaintiffs total damages. Exacting more severe penalties, such as
quadruple or quintuple damages, might better deter antitrust violators. Settlements could be encouraged by exacting substantial fees
for the use of the courts. Yet Congress has been reluctant to use such
direct means to achieve antitrust policy goals, preferring instead to
tinker with procedural devices such as contribution. 67
This Part of the Note discusses the relation between the various
policy goals and a defendant's right to contribution. Although the
goals are considered separately, they are neither independent nor absolute. A contribution rule that achieves perfect fairness may entail
65. Bayh Bill, supra note 52, at § 41(a).
66. The Bayh Bill leaves contribution rules in non-price-fixing cases to judicial development See text accompanying note 55 supra.
67. Although courts continue to wrestle with central principles of antitrust doctrine, see
Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developme_nts- 1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. I, I (1980), most recent
Congressional reform proposals involve procedural changes. See 950 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) E-13 (Feb. 7, 1980) (describing five antitrust procedural reform bills under
consideration in the House of Representatives).
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intolerable complexity; a rule that deters all violations may be intolerably unfair.
A.

Fairness

Because joint antitrust violators are jointly and severally liable
for all damages caused by their common activity, a private plaintiff
may sue one violator for all damages incurred. When a defendant
singled out for such a suit is denied contribution, he alone must pay
treble the damages caused by all the joint violators. 68 Courts and
commentators often refer to the unfairness of this result. 69 Three
types of inequity fall under the fairness rubric in the antitrust contribution debate. Denying contribution may cause unfairness (1) by
inequitably allocating loss among joint violators, (2) by making possible collusion against one of the violators by the plaintiff and another violator, and (3) by enabling plaintiffs to coerce defendants
into settlement.
1.

Unfairness in the Allocation of Loss

Regardless of the plaintiff's motive for targeting one antitrust violator for suit,70 the denial of contribution in such a case seems unfair because it "places the full burden of restitution upon one who is
only in part responsible for a plaintiff's loss." 71 This result seems
especially unfair if the violators that escape liability are more culpable than the defendant, 72 or if the defendant unintentionally violated
the law.73
68. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968);
Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
69. See, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc., v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, I 185 (8th Cir. 1979); Note, supra note 23, at 703.
70. See text at notes 77-83 i'!fra.
71. Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Cooper Stevedoring
Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (contribution among jointly negligent tortfeasors
allowed because " . . . a more 'equal distribution of justice' can best be achieved by ameliorating the common-Jaw rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two
wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, though the other may have been equally or more to
blame").
72. Consider the case of a small distributor unable to resist a large manufacturer's pressure
to join a resale price conspiracy. A plaintiff injured by the conspiracy may prefer to sue the
distributor, fearing that the manufacturer's resources would make it too formidable an opponent in court.
73. See note 156 i'!fra; Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas.
79,699, 79,707 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 27,
1979). See also Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
835 (1957).
In a sense, Olson Farms was forced to pay more than its "share" of the damages, since the
recovery included damages attributable to sales of the other violators. But joint and several
liability is imposed upon antitrust defendants for the very reason that violator's wrongdoing
was necessary to the combination or conspiracy. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J., concurring); W. PROSSER, supra note I,§ 47,
at 296-97. Although Olson Farms allegedly purchased only eleven percent of the eggs sold by
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Olson Farms dramatically illustrates how the denial of contribution can result in an unfair allocation of damages among joint violators. Although Olson Farms was the smallest of the price-fixers by
sales, the plaintiffs sued that company alone for treble damages. The
judgment Olson Farms eventually paid amounted to twenty-four
times the damages immediately caused by the company's egg
purchases.
Concerns for allocative unfairness should not be dismissed by appealing to the rationale for joint and several liability under the antitrust laws. Joint and several liability enables an antitrust plaintiff to
recover all his damages from any one joint violator because each
violator is deemed to have been a material cause of the damages. 74
Joint and several liability need not, however, be applied so as to
punish a defendant by requiring that he alone bear the loss for all
violators.75 Joint and several liability probably seeks only to ensure
that the plaintiff is fully compensated for his loss, regardless of
whether he is able to name all those responsible for the loss in his
suit.76 There is a fundamental difference between saying a plaintiff
can state a sufficient case by suing any one violator, and saying that
the loss must remain entirely upon a defendant so singled out. This
latter result, and the allocative unfairness which accompanies it, is
solely the result of a rule barring contribution.

2.

Uefairness in P!aint!fjs Choice of a .Defendant

The unfairness of requiring a single violator to bear the entire
burden of a judgment may be aggravated by a plaintiffs improper
motives for selecting a particular defendant. Where there is joint
the plaintiffs, without its cooperation the conspiracy might have broken up with no injury to
the plaintiffs. In that sense, Olson Farms was responsible for the plaintiffs' entire loss.
The percentage of sales or profits made by each violator may be an appropriate measure of
contribution shares, however. See note 171 infra and accompanying text.
14. See Perma Life Muffler, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1967)
(White, J., concurring); W. PROSSER, supra note I, at 296-97.
75. Rights to contribution coexist with joint and several liability in many states. See Note,
Contribution Among Joint Tor!feasors, 12 GA. L. REV. 553, 572-73 & nn.102-05 (1978).
76. The chief benefit of joint and several liability in tort actions is to help the plaintiff
recover full compensation for his injury in a single judgment. It allows the plaintiff to limit his
suit or the execution of a joint judgment to the violator or violators best able to pay. See
Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence al Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF, L. REV,
239, 251 (1976). A plaintiff forced to sue each violator separately for a portion of his loss
would risk an incomplete recovery: even if he could overcome the obstacles to obtaining and
executing a judgment against each violator, the sum of these separate judgments might fall
short of total loss. A rule allowing contribution would still permit the plaintiff to recover his
entire loss in a single judgment while enabling a sole defendant to spread the burden of this
judgment among other violators. See Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative Negligence in Flor•
ida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 790 (1974).
The rule of joint and several liability may also deter violators more effectively than a rule
that would limit a joint violator's liability to a portion of the plaintifrs loss. Allowing contributions would erase this difference. Whether contribution would decrease deterrence, and
whether such a decrease is undesirable, is discussed at text accompanying notes 101-16 i'!fra.
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and several liability, a plaintiff may use any of a number of criteria
in deciding whom to sue. He may consider the convenience of suing
a violator, the strength of evidence against that violator, and the violator's ability to satisfy a judgment. Two criteria for a plaintiff's
choice of defendant seem particularly troublesome. First, a plaintiff
may choose a competitor for suit over other joint violators due to an
anticompetitive motive. Second, some joint violators may escape being sued because of a special relationship with the plaintiff.77
These last two motives are arguably present in the Professional
Beauty case. Professional may have chosen to sue National rather
than the larger and allegedly more culpable La Maur because of a
desire to maintain good business relations with the manufacturer
which supplied its needs. 78 National may also have been singled out
for suit because it was Professional's competitor in the sales of La
Maur products in Minnesota.79
Some have implied that the improper motives present in Professional Beauty occur infrequently in antitrust litigation. 80 Although
cases .of 'collusive' activity are very rarely recorded in reported decisions, 81 it nevertheless seems likely that plaintiffs in most antitrust
77. The relationship may take a variety of forms. The plaintiff may be a blood relative of
one of the potential defendants. See Norfolk & Southern R.R. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E.
678 (1924). The plaintiff may own a company that is one of the potential defendants. See
Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn Rys. Co., ll0 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924). One of the
potential defendants may have bribed the plaintiff with either money or testimony against
coconspirators. See Leflar, supra note 3, at 137. This last relationship is not as horrendous as
Leflar indicates, for it is really the equivalent of a settlement agreement in which a defendant
exchanges money and access to its files for a release of liability.
To speak of these relationships as "collusive,'' see, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v.
National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, I 186 (8th Cir. 1979); SENATE REPORT, supra note
53, at I, is not helpful. Collusion is a secret agreement between two parties, whose interests
apparently conflict, to make use of the forms and proceedings oflaw to defraud a third person.
See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571, 26 S.W. 599 (1894). Regardless of a plaintiff's
motives, an antitrust defendant is not legally wronged when the plaintiff agrees, or decides on
his own, not to sue a joint violator. See text at note 83 i'!fra.
Improper motives may result in more than just unfairness to a party selected for suit. To
the extent that a violator can predict his omission as a defendant, either because he knows he
can effectively threaten the plaintiff or because the plaintiff will otherwise not wish to sue him,
he will not be deterred from the unlawful behavior. A right to contribution, however, assures
that if the plaintiff decides to sue any violator, that violator can force other favored or feared
violators to share the loss. If contribution were allowed, the plaintiff would have to choose
between foregoing any recovery and exposing the favored or feared .violator to liability.
78. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d ll79, 1185
(8th Cir. 1979).
79. 594 F.2d at ll8I.
80. According to Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield, Professional Beauty raised
"unusual" questions of inequity. 923 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (July 19,
1979).
81. All the literature discussing contribution in the contexts of tort law, securities, and
antitrust has cited only two cases of"collusive activity," by plaintiffs, both occurring more than
fifty years ago. See note 77 supra. Professor Leflar suggested that although a record of collusion rarely appears in reported decisions, "It is common knowledge that such undercover dealings occur constantly in perSonal injury cases. . • ." Leflar, supra note 3, at 137 n.35.
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suits consider their relationship to violators as competitor or customer before selecting a defendant. 82 Judge Thornberry's claim that
a victim of improper motives may have an independent cause of action is unfounded.83 Since contribution rights enable a victim of improper motives to spread the loss among joint violators, this type of
unfairness could be remedied by a liberal contribution rule.
3.

Unfairness in the Coercion of Settlements

Joint antitrust violators may suffer the unfairness of the no-contribution rule even in cases that never go to trial. An astute plaintiff's attorney can threaten to sue a smaller company alone for treble
damages attributable to the sales of much larger joint violators. 84 A
company faced with this massive liability may have little choice but
to settle and to surrender its opportunity to go to trial on the merits
of its case. 85 Antitrust practitioners have spoken bitterly of this un82. The Utah egg producers may well have considered Olson Farm's small size, and hence
the relative unimportance of having it continue to buy eggs, in their decision to sue Olson
Farms rather than their more important customers. During the trial of the original plaintiffs'
suit against Olson Farms, one of the defense attorneys asked one of the plaintiffs why another
more important violator had not been sued:
Q. You didn't sue Countryside in this case?
A. No, sir.
Q. Whynot?
A. For the simple reason that we were doing business with them, and they was taking
[sic] our eggs. And it's pretty hard when you have 1,200 cases on the market to be
dropped.
Trial Record at 4632-33, Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
83. A single lawsuit with an anticompetitive motive may be a violation of Sherman Act§ 2
within the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assn. v. The Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979); Cyborg Sys., Inc. v.
Management Science America, Inc., (1978-1] Trade Cas. 73,914 (N.D. Ill. 1978), but the suit
must be baseless for the victim to gain relief. The only other independent actions a victim of
collusion might bring would sound in tort. An action for wrongful civil proceedings would not
lie because the victim cannot show termination of the collusive plaintiffs suit in his favor. See
W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 120 at 853. An action for abuse of process would also fail, because "there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the
process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Id.,§ 121 at 857.
84. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 105 (statement of Harold Kohn).
Plaintiffs' attorneys claim that small defendants are infrequently coerced into settlement,
Id., at 97, 104 (statement of Harold Kohn). This is refuted, however, by a plaintiffs' lawyer's
testimony in the Senate Hearings. When one defendant's attorney refused to settle in a suit
involving fifteen companies, the plaintiffs attorney told him,
All right, it is obvious that you are holding up everybody else from settling this litigation. You leave. We won't settle with you. We are going to settle with everybody
else. . . . [W]e are going to go after you alone, not only for the damages that you caused
but for everybody else's damages. . . . Goodbye; . . . we are not going to talk to you
anymore.
Id. at 54 (statement of David Shapiro). Within half an hour the threatened defendant had
settled. Id.
85. See ADA Report, supra note 13, at E-1; In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga•
tion, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd. withoutpublished opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16,
1980) (No. 79-972). Cf. Durham & Dibble, Cert!fication: A Practical .Devicefor Early Screen-
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fairness:
In the nearly half century of my practice I have never seen a single
other circumstance which has created the cynicism at the bar that has
arisen from the settlement negotiations in these cases. . . . Nor have I
ever seen before anything to equal the consternation of unbelieving
businessmen, large and small, when told that the law literally does not
provide them with a process for determining the merits of their defense; that any settlement within their purse, as a practical matter, may
be their only chance for survival.86

The coercion of settlements in joint antitrust violation cases has
been refined into a litigation device known as the "whipsaw." Whipsawing is the process by which lawyers for class action plaintiffs negotiate settlements with different defendants in stages, charging
progressively more for settlement at each stage. Under present law,
when one antitrust defend ant settles, other defendants remain liable
for three times all damages incurred by the plaintiff minus only the
amount received in settlement. 87 Plaintiffs typically settle cheaply
with smaller defendants early in the litigation, 88 using the money
thus raised to finance the litigation against remaining defendants.
Defendants who settle early in the whipsaw usually pay far less than
their share of the trebled liability - whether computed according to
market shares or on some other basis89 - and non-settling defendants remain liable for the difference. As increasing numbers of defendants settle, leaving an ever-smaller pool of non-settling
defendants to share the remaining potential liability, 90 plaintiffs are
ing ofSpurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 302-03; Handler, The Shift From
Substanlire lo Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 CoLUM L. REV. I, 9 (1971) (threat
to small defendant of large litigation costs). The Supreme Court has recently expressed concern that some defendants may be forced to abandon a meritorious defense. See Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (listing this as one of several considerations in
refusing to allow a circuit court to immediately review decertification of a class by a district
court). A small company in a capital-intensive industry, aware that a complaint naming it as
the sole defendant in a large antitrust conspiracy suit would cause its credit sources to dry up,
may have no choice but to settle. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 15.
86. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199, 207 (1976).
87. If two violators caused a plaintiff $100,000 in damages, and the plaintiff settles with
one prior to trial for $25,000, the remaining violator is liable for $100,000 trebled minus
$25,000, or $275,000. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 344
(1971); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 509-10 (1964) (plurality opinion).
88. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 95, 97, 106 (statement of Harold Kohn). But see
Senate Hearings, id. at 68 (statement of Donald Kempf describing a suit in which one of the
largest defendants settled first).
89. See notes 170-72 infra and accompanying text.
90. Until judgment is executed, a non-settling defendant theoretically risks the possibility
that he may at any time become solely liable for the total outstanding liability: the plaintiff
may suddenly drop his case against all other remaining joint defendants, subject to approval
by the court in a class action, or, if the plaintiff recovers a joint judgment, he may choose to
execute it solely against the particular defendant. Practically, however, the defendant knows
that if the plaintiff recovers a joint judgment, he will usually choose to execute it against all the
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able to exact progressively higher settlements.91 By the latter stages
of the whipsaw, a company directly responsible for only a small fraction of a plaintiffs damages may alone face liability for damages
caused by an entire industry.92 As one court observed, "[t]hat this
possibility is inherently coercive is indisputable." 93
A rule allowing antitrust contribution against settling defendants
would put an end to whipsawing, 94 as would a rule reducing a plaintiffs claim by the contribution share a settling defendant would have
had to pay if he had not settled. 95 It is each non-settling defendant's
growing share of liability that gives teeth to the plaintiff's threat at
each stage of settlement. If claims for contribution against settling
defendants were allowed, or if a plaintiffs claim were reduced by the
contribution share of a settling defendant, the threat would evaporate.
It may not be too much to say that a desire on the part of large
defendants' attorneys to end whipsawing, and a similar desire by
class action plaintiffs' lawyers to maintain it, is the real inspiration
for a controversy which has been couched in the broader language of
contribution. Whipsawing has been successful and profitable for
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers, and enormously costly for corporate
defendants. Settlements achieved through whipsawing are inequitable both because defendants may have no practical opportunity to go
to trial on the merits, and because defendants often pay damages
attributable to those settling before them.
non-settling defendants. As that group shrinks with each settlement, a non-settling defendant
knows that his likely actual share of the remaining liability increases. He is therefore willing
to pay a higher price for settlement.
91. Suppose, for example, that an antitrust plaintiff alleges $1,000,000 in damages caused
by five defendants, each with a 20% market share. Suppose also that each defendant, having
computed the probability of an unfavorable judgment and the relative costs of trying and
settling the case, is willing to settle for 50% of his share of the potential liability. Defendant A,
the first defendant approached for settlement, settles for $300,000 - 50% of his 1/5 share of
the potential $3,000,000 judgment. The second settling defendant, defendant B, would be willing to pay $337,500, figuring that he risks a 1/4 share of the remaining $2,700,000 potential
liability. Or he may fear that if he does not settle quickly, the three remaining nonsettling
defendants will settle for $400,000 each, leaving him to face alone a $1,500,000 potential liability. To avoid this later, more expensive settling position, B may be willing to settle for up to
$750,000 - 50% of the potential $1,500,000 liability. The fear of being the last one to settle
thus motivates prompt as well as large settlements.
92. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), q/fd.
withoutpublished opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp.
v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). For a description
of the mechanics of the whipsaw in the Container litigation, see SENATE REPORT, supra note
53, at 14-16.
93. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), q/fd.
without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp.
v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972).
94. Such a rule, however, would deter violators from settling. See text at notes 121-25
i,!fra.
95. This rule also has its drawbacks. See text at notes 126-30 i,!fra.
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Some practitioners have argued that fairness concerns in the contribution debate are unwarranted because defendants can use sharing agreements with joint violators to prevent whipsawing and unfair
allocation of loss.96 A sharing agreement contractually allocates liability for an antitrust violation among the defendants. It typically
provides that, should one of the parties to the agreement settle before
judgment at trial, that party will still be liable to the other parties for
its specified share of damages minus the sum paid in settlement.
Sharing agreements, like contribution rights, enable defendants to
spread the loss among themselves.
Sharing agreements are not a perfect substitute for contribution
rights, however. Although sharing agreements are fairly common
among larger antitrust defendants in class action suits,97 in many
cases - especially those involving large numbers of defendants the defendants may not be able to reach an agreement. 98 In addition, a court might refuse to enforce antitrust sharing agreements on
the grounds that they hinder settlement and reduce deterrence. 99
The existence of sharing agreements therefore does little to ease the
fairness concerns raised by a rule barring contribution.
If our only concern in antitrust suits involving joint violators
were to achieve fair outcomes, the case for contribution would be
unassailable. The rule barring contribution allows plaintiffs,
through their nearly absolute power to allocate liability, to force violators to pay more than their fair share of damages, to single out
competitors as defendants, and to coerce settlements from innocent
96. See ABA Report, supra note 13, at E-2.
97. See Letter from Carl Steinhouse to Michigan Law Review Association (Oct. 22, 1979)
(on file with the Michigan Law Review); Letter from Harold Kohn to Michigan Law Review
Association (Nov. 9, 1979) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Mr. Steinhouse is a former
director of the Great Lakes Field Office of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division; Mr.
Kohn is a prominent antitrust plaintiffs' attorney.
98. See Paul, supra note 2, at 83; Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 55, 85; SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 2; Letter from Darryl Snider to Michigan Law Review Association
(Aug. 20, 1980) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Violators not named in the plaintiff's
suit will not assume contractual liability because the no-contribution rule effectively frees them
from fear of tort liability. Even defendants who are named in suits may refuse to join in a
sharing agreement because of a tactical belief that they will pay less by settling with the plaintiff than by contracting with codefendants. See Analysis, Contribution - Fairness or Folly in
Antitrust Litigation?, 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) B-1, B-4 (June 6, 1979).
99. The Second Circuit has refused to enforce an agreement completely shifting liability to
one of several violators in a securities case. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (refusing enforcement because of
concern for the deterrent policy of the securities laws). In securities cases parties are free to
contract as to their contribution shares only if the contracts do not violate public policy. See
Note, supra note 16, at 1313 & n.333. Agreements that force a settling defendant to pay further
damages to codefendants after settlement might substantially reduce the incentive to settle.
Both the ABA Statute, see ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at § (h), and the Bayh Bill, see
SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 2, assume the legality of sharing agreements.
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defendants. But equity is not costless. 100 Greater fairness must be
balanced with the effects of contribution on other antitrust policy
goals.
B. .Deterrence

The primary purpose behind private treble damage suits is to encourage plaintiffs to act as "private attorneys general" in enforcing
the antitrust laws. 101 By augmenting the limited resources available
for government prosecutions, this private enforcement encourages
compliance with the law. 102 Courts considering whether to allow
contribution have inquired whether contribution rights would amplify or diminish the deterrent effect of private treble damage suits.
Echoing the reasoning of other courts 103 and commentators, 104 the
Eighth Circuit decided that allowing contribution would better deter
violators than barring contribution. 105 The Fifth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion. 106 This Section first explains why the Fifth Circuit has the better of the deterrence argument. It then examines
whether the increased measure of deterrence achieved by barring
contribution is desirable as a matter of antitrust policy.
There are three reasons why allowing contribution will reduce
the deterrent effect of private antitrust suits. First, a rule allowing
contribution would probably make large class actions - in which
whipsawing is common - less attractive to plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
lawyers. If a primary goal of allowing contribution is to prevent coercion and whipsawing of settlements, such a rule will inevitably discourage suits which are at present :financed by these techniques. 107
Second, because most corporate managers are probably risk-averse,
preferring the certainty of a small loss (with contribution) to a small
possiblity of a large loss (sole liability without contribution), they
100. See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case
far Treble .Damages, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 329, 353-54 (1974).
101. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251,262 (1972).
102. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
103. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Liggett & Meyers Inc.
v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In these cases, all implying rights of
contribution under the securities laws, the reasoning that allowing contribution, and hence
distributing the costs of a violation among all the violators, will increase deterrence figures
prominently. This reasoning may have to be reconsidered in view of its rejection by the Fifth
Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.
1979).
104. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 9; Corbett, supra note 2, at 137.
105. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F. 2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979).
106. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.
1979).
101. See text at notes 84-96 supra.
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will be more deterred by a rule which prevents dispersion of damages among violators. 108 Finally, to the extent that potential plaintiffs would refrain from bringing suits because of the complexity
engendered by contribution, 109 allowing contributions would diminish deterrence.
This conclusion does not justify an absolute bar to contribution,
however, because maxiroizinr; deterrence is not an unqualified goal
of antitrust policy. Limits are placed on the severity of punishment
for violation of the antitrust laws not because of a lessened desire for
compliance, but because unlimited deterrence entails greater costs
than society is willing to bear. The increased deterrence attributable
to a rule barring contribution entails not only the social costs of its
unfairness, but also economic costs in its effects on economically desirable conduct. Excessive penalties can cause businesses to shun
competitive practices lying close to the borderline of impermissible
conduct - to avoid price competition out of fear that it may be
found to be predatory, for example, or to refuse to release price information for fear that it may be interpreted as price-:fixing. 110 The
danger of overdeterrence suggests that there is an optimal level of
deterrence that antitrust remedies should achieve, 111 a level that varies among types of violations by their gravity and their resemblance
to competitive conduct. 112
It is unclear whether our present system of antitrust remedies
reaches, overshoots, or falls short of the optimal level of deterrence.
One could reasonably argue that the optimal level is already exceeded for some violations and not yet reached for others; that price
discrimination is overdeterred and blatant horizontal price-fixing not
punished enough. 113 One's opinion about the relation between the
present level of deterrence and the optimal level affects one's belief
108. As the Fifth Circuit suggests, 604 F.2d at 901 & n.8, economic theory strongly supports this conclusion. Economic theory and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of
the "risk-averse" corporate manager are summarized in K. ELIZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST REMEDIES 126-29 (1976). Although much of the economic literature concerns large
corporations, there is reason to believe that smaller companies will be even more risk-averse
than large ones. See Note, In Pari .Delicto and the .Deterrence efAntitrust Violations, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 59, 77-78 (1977). The implications of risk-averseness for antitrust policy are explored.
in Austin, Negative Jfffects of Treble .Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353, 1357-66.
109. See text at notes 143-46 infra.
110. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW§ 309c (1978); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 78 (1978); SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 18. The Supreme Court has
noted the particular danger of overdeterrence when penalties are applied to unintentional violators. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 & n.17 (1978).
111. If there is some level of deterrence that is excessive because it chills competitive behavior, there must be some limit to the desirable level of antitrust deterrence.
112. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (testimony of John Shenefield describing
greater danger of overdeterrence in monopolization than in price-fixing cases).
113. See R. BORK, supra note l 10, at 382-402.
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in the appropriateness of allowing contribution. If, as some suggest, 114 we are already overdeterring some violators, the reduced deterrence resulting from giving those violators a right to contribution
would promote procompetitive antitrust policy.
Admittedly, this analysis poses more questions than it answers.
It does suggest that courts and legislators have been wrong in asking
only how contribution would affect deterrence, without further inquiring whether that effect would be desirable. Policymakers need
first to determine where present levels of deterrence stand relative to
the optimum115 before deciding whether deterrence weighs for or
against contribution.116

C. Promotion of Settlement
Courts seek to encourage pre-trial settlement of private antitrust
suits because such a compromise lessens the expense of litigation for
courts, plaintiffs, and defendants alike. 117 The most common argument against allowing contribution is that it will discourage settlement.118 The force of this argument depends upon whether the
contribution rule (1) allows actions for contribution against other violators who have previously settled with the plaintiff, (2) forbids contribution actions against settling parties and reduces the plaintiff's
claim against the remaining defendants by only the amount received
114. See generally R. BORK supra note 110.
115. There is limited evidence that one set of policy-makers, the Supreme Court, may believe we have already allowed private remedies to overshoot the optimal deterrence level. See
Reiter v. Sonotone Inc., 442 U.S. 330, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977).
116. The level of deterrence could also be affected by the broad spectrum of antitrust bills
now in Congress. For a brief summary of pending legislation as of 1979, see Regnery, Antitrust
Reform: The Congressional Prognosis, 15 TRIAL, no. 4, 29 (April 1979).
117. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Intl., Inc., 455 F.2d
770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 835 (1957); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp. 742, 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), '!!fd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1978). Antitrust suits frequently terminate in settlement.
See Withrow & Larm, The "Big"Antitrust Case: 25 Years ofSisyphean Labor, 62 CORNl!LL L.
Rev. I, 6-8 (1976). Of the 1,307 private antitrust actions terminated in 1978, only eight percent
reached trial. Five hundred thirty-seven were terminated with no court action, and 395 more
were terminated before pre-trial procedures began. See ADMINISTRATIVI! OFFICI! OF THI!
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS Table C-4 (1978). It is
reasonable to infer that a large percentage of these terminations involved settlements between
the parties. See Note, supra note 108, at 60 n.8.
Although settlements are desirable, not all rules facilitating settlement will automatically
be beneficial. Settlement is not an absolute goal, and "[c]ongestion in the courts cannot justify
a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court
accommodations." United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975) (refusing
to retain an admiralty rule equally dividing damages without regard to fault).
118. See, e.g., Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1968); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), '!!fd without published opinion,
606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48
U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [19771] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 39.
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in settlement, 119 or (3) forbids such actions but provides that the
plaintiff will give up a larger portion of his claim. 120 This Section
discusses th.e effect of each of these rules on parties' incentives to
settle.
Holding settling defendants liable for contribution 121 would diminish their incentive to settle. One reason defendants settle rather
than litigate the merits of disputes is that they prefer to avoid the
uncertainties of trial and to proceed with their normal business. 122
In a word, they desire :finality. An antitrust settlement typically releases the defendant from all further liability to the plaintiff, 123 and,
where contribution is barred, the settling defendant enjoys peace of
mind in the knowledge that the litigation is behind him. Where contribution against settling defendants is allowed, settlement may not
bring such repose. A joint defendant who settles with the plaintiff
will still be subject to suits for contribution brought by the remaining
defendants. 124 This chilling effect on defendants' incentive to settle
is a primary reason courts have denied claims seeking contribution
from settling antitrust defendants. 125
Conceivably, a rule allowing contribution could exempt settling
defendants. Such a rule would provide relief in cases such as Professional Beauty, Abraham Construction, or Olson Farms, where no violators settled with the plaintiff. The rule would not affect the
defendant's ":finality" interest in settling, and hence would do nothing to discourage settlement. But neither would it remedy some of
the unfairness from which demands for contribution have arisen.
Whipsawing and coercion of settlements would remain feasible
under this rule. Diluting the contribution remedy with an exemption
for settling defendants will reduce its effectiveness as a cure for unfairness.
To preserve the contribution rule's power to prevent unfairness
while protecting a defendant's :finality interest in settling, the pro119. See text at note 87 supra.
120. An intriguing possibility beyond the scope of this Note is that of contribution actions
by settling defendants against unnamed coconspirators or non-settling defendants. Such a
possibility is not necessarily barred by the Bayh Bill, but is forbidden under the ABA Statute.
ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§ (e). A settling defendant is allowed to sue for contribution
in certain circumstances under the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§ 4(b). See generally
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 307-10.
121. Several courts have allowed contribution claims against settling securities law violators. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1272-74 (D. Del. 1978); Altman v. Liberty
Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
122. See Note, Se/1/ement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rev. 486 (1966).
123. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
124. To correct this problem, the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was
revised in 1955 to prohibit contribution against settling defendants. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT§ 4(b) and Commissioners' Co=ent.
125. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979).
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posed contribution statutes have combined a bar to actions against
settling defendants with provisions reducing the remaining defendants' liability by an amount that will usually be larger than the
amount paid in settlement. 126 Under the Bayh Bill, the plaintiff's
claims against non-settling defendants are reduced by "treble the actual damages attributable to the settling [defendant's] sales or
purchases of goods or service." 127 The ABA Statute reduces claims
in proportion to the relative responsibility of the settling defendant
for the plaintiff's damages. 128 These rules preserve a defendant's
finality interest in settling while assuring fairness to non-settling defendants. The plaintiff, however, must give up a considerably larger
portion of his claim under these rules than under present law, 129 and
will therefore have less incentive to settle. The plaintiff's sacrifice is
further aggravated under the ABA Statute, because he cannot predict the "relative responsibility" of the settling defendant with certainty before an adjudication of liability at trial. 130 This uncertainty
will further discourage plaintiffs from settling, or at the least will
delay settlement until the later stages of litigation, when the benefits
of settlement are greatly diminished.
Despite its tendency to discourage plaintiffs from settling, claim
reduction - itself a complex and hotly debated issue within the contribution controversy 131 - may be appropriate in many antitrust
cases. 132 Plaintiffs will still have strong incentives to settle under a
contribution rule exempting settling defendants and requiring claim
reduction. By settling, plaintiffs will be rapidly compensated and
will avoid further litigation expenses. Plaintiffs will also avoid the
risk of an unfavorable judgment at trial. The strength of these incentives is illustrated by recent settlement agreements in which plaintiffs
assume any potential contribution liability of settling defendants. 133
126. At present the plaintiff's judgment against remaining defendants is reduced by the
amount paid by the settling defendant. See note 87 supra.
127. Bayh Bill, supra note 12, at § 41(b). If the settlement agreement provides that the
plaintiff will reduce his claim by a larger amount, or if the amount paid in settlement is larger,
then the plaintiff's claim is reduced by such larger amount. Id.
A district court following Professional Beauty used an apparently similar method. See Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 63,059 at 77,251 (E.D. Ark.
1979) (letter opinion) (releasing "non-settling defendants from any joint and several liability
they may have for any overcharges attributable to Settling Defendant's sales to the Settlement
Class or otherwise"). See also note 9 supra.
128. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§§ (f), (g). For an explanation of "relative responsibility," see note 170 infra.
129. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
130. See Minority Report, supra note 61, at§ B(l).
131. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 31-32.
132. The best solution may be to allow courts to fashion appropriate relief - be it claim
reduction o; contribution against settling defendant - when the problem arises. See text at
notes 171-74 infra.
133. See note 9 supra.

May 1980]

Note - Antitrust Contribution

915

D. Reduced Complexity of Litigation
Private antitrust suits are often extremely complex affairs, involving numerous parties, years of negotiations and litigation, and sophisticated legal and economic issues. 134 The Supreme Court has
noted the concern for the heavy burden these suits impose upon the
courts. 135 Attorney General Civiletti has complained that antitrust
litigation has become too lengthy, too costly, and too complicated. 136
In view of the concern over the present level of complexity, it is not
surprising that courts are reluctant to inject a new class of claims into
antitrust cases. Contribution, it is feared, will "open a Pandora's box
of procedural problems." 137 The added complexity engendered -by
contribution claims will impose varying burdens on courts, plaintiffs,
and defendants.
Allowing contribution will increase the amount of time that
courts devote to antitrust litigation. Judges will have to adjudicate
claims routinely barred or never brought in the past. In ruling on
these claims, courts will have to develop rules to resolve such complex issues as measurement of contribution shares, the relationship
of contribution to settlement, and claim reduction. 138 Experience
under the securities laws, which contain express contribution provisions, warns that large numbers of new claims for contribution can
be expected should antitrust contribution be allowed. 139
134. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd without published
opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract
Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972).
135. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (Burger, C.J.), 345-46 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (1979).
136. See Address by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, American Bar Association Section of Litigation (Chicago, Nov. 10, 1979).
137. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir.
1979). See also Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 52 (testimony of David Shapiro).
Fears that contribution will create procedural complexity have not been unique to antitrust
law. More than forty years ago, when express contribution provisions were included in the
securities acts, Professor (later Justice) Douglas complained of the "unseemly, inefficient, and
expensive" spectacle that would result. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171, 180-81 (1933).
138. Some of these issues may be decided by Congress. See Bayh Bill, supra note 12.
Courts are still struggling with these issues in securities suits. See generally Note, supra note
16. Contribution among defendants in private securities actions is expressly allowed under
section l l(f) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976), and sections 9(e) and
18(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(e), r(a) (1976). Contribution
rights have been implied under several other sections of the Acts. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross,
601 F.2d 330, 331-34 (7th Cir. 1979).
139. There were few claims for contribution under the securities laws prior to the late
1960s. After the courts began to void contractual indemnification agreements in securities
cases, there was a burgeoning of contribution claims. See Note, supra note 16, at 1256. Since
indemnification is barred in antitrust cases, see Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, I 186-87 (8th Cir. 1979), it is reasonable to expect a similar
flurry of contribution claims in antitrust litigation. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
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Plaintiffs will also suffer from the increased complexity of litigation if third party claims or cross claims for contribution are allowed.
Each new contribution claim will expand the scope of the plaintiff's
suit, delay his recovery, and add to his litigation expenses. 140 This
hardship could be alleviated by severance of contribution claims
from the plaintiff's suit, but circuit judges differ as to whether discretionary severance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) 141 is
an adequate remedy. 142
Whether or not contribution's benefits justify forcing courts and
plaintiffs to incur increased expenses, one can argue that the complexity engendered by contribution will discourage plaintiffs from
bringing suits, thus lessening the threat of private antitrust enforcement. "Aware that litigation may spiral out of their control, it is
foreseeable that some plaintiffs will decide to forego a legitimate
cause of action." 143 This reasoning may be challenged on two levels.
First, the conclusion itself is questionable. Powerful incentives to
bring private actions (including trebling of damages and recovery of
1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S.
June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972), for a description of the multitude of potential claims in a class
action involving numerous defendants.
140. It has been suggested that defendants might abuse contribution rights by filing contribution claims against numerous parties who may be only remotely connected to the alleged
violation. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339,
1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). District courts would probably be able to detect and to deal with this
problem should it arise.
141. The text of section (b) reads as follows:
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b).
142. Compare Judge Stephenson's opinion in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1979) ("district courts have the ability to
sever issues and parties if the need arises"), and Judge Morgan's dissent in Wilson P. Abraham
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1979) ("I simply cannot believe
that the discretionary nature of the Rule 42(b) separate trials provision would discourage an
antitrust plaintiff from seeking treble damages"), with Judge Hanson's dissent in Professional
Beauty, 594 F.2d at I 190 (stating favorable uses of district court discretion are a "mere possibility"), and Judge Thomberry's opinion in Abraham Construction, 604 F.2d at 905 (quoting
Judge Hanson).
Only three securities cases have discussed severance of a contribution claim under rule
42(b). In one case the claims were severed to protect the plaintiff's interest. Sherlee Land v.
Co=onwealth United Corp., (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 93,749
at 93,273 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In a second case the claims were so intertwined as to make sever•
ance impossible. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63
F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). A third, in dicta, claimed that there could be severance whenever
the trial judge believes it to be in the interest of orderliness and simplification of the issues.
Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
143. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, I 190
(8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting in part).
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attorney fees) 144 would remain, despite the added complexity
threatened by contribution. As the Eighth Circuit observed, contribution provisions in the securities laws have not deterred the bringing of many private suits that are as complex as private antitrust
suits. 145 Second, the underlying assumption - that a reduction in
the deterrence of antitrust violations is undesirable - is not always
valid. As noted earlier, 146 there may be some classes of violations
that are already overdeterred.
Even defendants, the intended beneficiaries of a rule allowing
contribution, may find that the rule makes litigation more complex
and expensive. Not only will they bear the additional costs of litigating the contribution claims, 147 but they will also have difficulty
agreeing on joint defense efforts. When all the defendants in a private suit can agree on a common defense strategy cooperatively,
there is a considerable saving of court and attorney time in litigation.
A joint defense is unlikely when defendants are vigorously prosecuting claims for contribution against each other. 148 Proponents of contribution have impliedly acknowledged that joint defense
agreements will be less frequent if contribution is allowed. 149
Policymakers considering the antitrust contribution issue need to
give careful attention to the problem of increased complexity.
Courts, plaintiffs, and defendants already expend vast amounts of
resources litigating private antitrust suits. Contribution rules should
be devised with a view to minimizing any increase in these costs.
Ill.

BALANCING CONFLICTING GOALS: THE SEARCH FOR AN
.APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION RULE

Fairness is advanced by allowing contribution; settlement and
procedural simplicity are advanced by barring it. Deterrence considerations may argue for or against contribution, depending on the adequacy of antitrust penalties imposed for the type of practice at issue.
144. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
145. Professional Beauty Supply Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 118485 (8th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 16, at 1257.
146. See text at notes 110-14 supra.
147. The type of contribution rule adopted can itself affect the complexity of contribution
claims. See text at note 162 i,!fra.
148. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.),
qffd. without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco
Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). Plaintiffs
may therefore benefit if contribution is allowed, since defendants will be attempting to prove
plaintiffs' claims against each other. Of course, where contribution liability is measured by
market share, rather than relative responsibility of the conspirators, defendants are much less
likely to abandon joint defense efforts and to quarrel with each other, since market shares are
more easily and objectively ascertained.
149. See ABA Report, supra note 13, at 16.
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Thus, courts and other rulemakers deciding whether to permit contribution cannot simultaneously advance all antitrust policy goals.
Rulemakers have reacted to the contribution dilemma by formulating three types of rules, each of which implies a balancing of policy goals. Some have stated absolute, unqualified rules, either
allowing or forbidding contribution in all cases. Others have created
"bright-line" rules, which look to the presence or absence of a single
factor (such as intent or price-fixing) in deciding when to grant contribution rights. Finally, the Eighth Circuit has elected to let courts
look at multiple factors on a case-by-case basis. This Part of the
Note examines the balance of policy goals struck by each of these
three types of rules - absolute, bright-line, and case-by-case - in
order to determine which rule is most desirable.
A. Absolute Contribution Rules

An absolute contribution rule either bars contribution in all
cases, as in Abraham Construction, or allows it in all cases, as under
the ABA Statute. An absolute rule makes sense if a balancing of
policies in the vast majority of cases would dictate identical results,
and the costs of screening out the occasional deviant case exceed the
benefits. 150 An absolute rule is appropriate under these conditions
because it is both efficient and clear.
Two considerations argue strongly against application of an absolute rule to antitrust contribution. First, scarcely a dozen antitrust
defendants have claimed contribution in reported cases to date. This
limited experience offers an inadequate basis for deciding that a balancing of policies would dictate identical results in most cases.
Second, there is good reason to believe that a proper balance of
antitrust policy goals will vary among cases, because the relevance of
concerns for fairness, deterrence, settlement, and reduced complexity
will vary significantly among cases. The degree of allocative, coercive, and collusive unfairness will differ with the facts of each case.
In one case an Olson Farms might pay twenty-four times the loss it
directly caused; in another a large manufacturer which originated a
price-fixing scheme might be seeking contribution from a tiny distributor. The importance of deterrence will vary with the type of
violation 151 and with the intent of the violator. 152 The fear of deterring settlement is only relevant where contribution is sought against
a settling defendant. Problems of complexity will increase with the
number of violators and potential contribution claims involved in
150. One part of these costs is the resources spent by the parties and courts in litigating
unsuccessful claims. See text following note 161 i,yra. Another cost is the added expense in
proving that contribution is warranted in a particular case. See text at note 162 i,yra.
151. See text at notes 103-16 supra.
152. See text at note 157 i,yra.
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the suit. Changing these variables simultaneously could yield an infinite number of permutations, any one of which may tum up in a
single case. Two hypothetical cases illustrate the potential extremes:
(1) Large Manufacturing Company decides to fix prices in violation
of the antitrust laws. It enlists the aid of Small Manufacturing Company. Buyer, who is injured by the conspiracy, brings a treble damages
action against Small alone, but does not object to Small's contribution
claim against Large.
(2) Huge Manufacturing Company, with the acquiescence of several hundred of its independent distributors, sets resale prices in violation of the antitrust laws, injuring Consumer. Consumer brings a
treble damages action against Huge, because of Huge's size and solvency, and against Tiny Distributing Company, one of the many distributors that sell Huge's products to Consumer. Consumer settles with
Tiny before trial. Huge then files claims for contribution against each
of the distributors that sell to Consumer, including Tiny, and Consumer strenuously objects.

In the first case, the balance of policy goals favors allowing contribution. Denying contribution would cause considerable unfairness here, because the most culpable violator escapes liability while a
less culpable violator shoulders the entire burden of liability. Since
the buyer sued only one defendant, there is no fear that a contribution action will deter settlement. Because there are only two violators
and the plaintiff does not object to the contribution claim, the concern for complexity of litigation is minimal. Where the resulting
fairness so heavily outweighs any possible harmful effects, contribution should be allowed.
In contrast, there are strong reasons for denying contribution in
the second case. Any unfairness in denying contribution is minimized by the defendant's status as ringleader of the conspiracy and
sole intentional violator. Moreover, unlike the first case, other policy
goals would be substantially affected if contribution were allowed.
Deterrence would be reduced, since an intentional violator would be
able to allocate the loss among all tortfeasors. Settlement would be
discouraged if a later action for contribution against settling defendants were allowed. Finally, complexity of litigation would be significantly increased by the addition of numerous claims (as the
plaintiffs objection to the claims may suggest).
If the relevance of policy goals can vary so drastically among
cases, so may an appropriate balance of those goals, as the hypothetical cases indicate. Because of that potential variance and our limited experience with antitrust contribution claims, an absolute rule
seems premature.
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Bright-Line Contribution Rules

If an absolute rule is untenable, the next simplest standard makes
the contribution issue tum on a single relevant fact. 153 Granting
contribution to unintentional but not to intentional violators, or to
price-fixers but not to non-price-fixers, are examples of "bright-line"
rules. 154 The fact which is chosen to mark the line of such a rule
should be drawn in such a way that improper results are minimized;
the line should accurately separate cases in which contribution
should be allowed from those where it should be forbidden. Since
simplicity is the most positive attribute of a bright-line rule, it should
also divide cases without adding significantly to the costs of antitrust
litigation. The analysis below shows that bright-line rules based on
intent and price-fixing inappropriately separate cases where contribution is allowed from those where it is denied, and that a rule based
on intent, far from simplifying antitrust litigation, would be exceedingly expensive to apply.
A bright-line rule based on the intent of the violator is intuitively
attractive, for it turns on the culpability of the violator and duplicates the English common-law rule allowing contribution only to unintentional tortfeasors. 155 Moreover, the rule takes into account two
of the policy goals that must be balanced in deciding whether to allow contribution. Fairness is a weightier concern where the party
seeking contribution unintentionally violated the law. 156 And a rule
barring contribution can have little beneficial deterrent effect if the
violator is unaware that his conduct is illegal and fails to consider
the sanctions that could accompany it. 157 The shift of fairness and
153. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 14
HARV. L. REV. 226, 278-79 (1960).
154. The rules proposed in lhe Bayh Bill and the Olson Farms decision are not precisely
"bright-line." The Bayh Bill mandates contribution in price-fixing cases, but leaves the issue
open in non-price-fixing cases. See text at note 55 supra. Olson Farms bars contribution to
intentional violators, but leaves a possible exception for unintentional violators. See text at
note 51 supra. Nevertheless, even lhese distinctions produce starkly different standards for
different classes of cases. That difference should be justified by !he policy considerations addressed here.
155. See W. PROSSER, supra note l, § 50, at 305-06.
156. To the extent that rules barring contribution are based on a desire to punish, see
Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Torifeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 559-60 (1936);
Leflar, supra note 3, at 134, it is inequitable to apply lhe punishment wilh equal harshness to
intentional and unintentional violators. This inequity is magnified where the unintentional
tortfeasor is barred from seeking contribution from one who intentionally violated the law,
and hence is arguably more culpable. See W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
358 F. Supp. 1388, 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1973), in which a court refused an intentional tortfeasor
contribution from an unintentional violator, in part on fairness grounds.
157. See Bohlen, supra note 156, at 558 (for unintentional torts "the deterrent force of the
denial of contribution, save in rare instances, is itself entirely lheoretical"). The Abraham Construction majority argues !hat barring contribution may give businesses further incentive to
"steer wide" of conduct which might violate !he antitrust laws. This assumes that legal con•
duct which approaches !he borders of illegality should be deterred. As the Supreme Court
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deterrence with intent indicates a more likely tip of the balance toward contribution in the case of an unintentional violator.
Nevertheless, there still may be cases where the balance tips toward contribution for an intentional violator. 158 The first hypothetical case above, in which a denial of contribution would allow a
larger, more culpable manufacturer to escape liability while forcing
a small distributor to pay the entire judgment, might b,e such a
case. 159 At the same time, one can imagine cases where unintentional violators should be denied contribution. Consider, for example, the complexity that would result if large manufacturers filed
contribution claims against all their distributors every time their systems of vertical restraints were challenged in private suits. Exactly
how often claims would be wrongly decided under an intent-based
rule is difficult to know because few defendants have claimed contribution in reported cases to date. Until we have more experience
with contribution in an antitrust context, we cannot be sure a line
based on intent would not mistakenly balance policy goals in many
cases.
An intent-based rule would also add substantial costs to antitrust
litigation. Distinguishing between intentional and unintentional violators is a difficult process. Ever since the Supreme Court ruled in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 160 that the element of intent is prerequisite to a criminal antitrust conviction, courts in criminal cases have struggled with different standards of proof of the
required intent. 161 Defendants who are uncertain whether their viorecognized in United States v. United -States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), such an assumption is mistaken:
The imposition of criminal liability . . . without inquiring into the intent with which [the
violation] was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary
and procompetitive conduct lying close to the border of impermissible conduct might be
shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty
regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a good faith error of judgment.
438 U.S. at 441.
158. Some courts and commentators have suggested that intentional violators should be
entitled to contribution. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J.
67, llO A.2d 24 (1954) (per Brennan, J., now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court) (allowing intentional tortfeasor contribution on statutory interpretation grounds), trial
judgment modified on remand, 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957); Leflar, supra note 3, at 145-46;
Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among Torifeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REV.
203, 232 (1975). The 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act gave a contribution
right to intentional tortfeasors, as does the 1976 Uniform Comparable Fault Act. The 1955
revision of the 1939 Act expressly denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors in section l(c).
Several cases have indicated that intentional violators of the securities laws have contribution
rights. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 230, 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin
Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
159. Another example is Professional Beauty, where a small distributor was singled out in a
suit alleging a joint intentional violation with a manufacturer. See text at notes 14-18 supra.
160. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 464-66 (3d Cir.
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lations will be found to be intentional will inevitably bring a large
number of unsuccessful claims, wasting their own resources as well
as those of other parties and the courts. More importantly, drawing
a line at intentional violations adds the difficult factual issue of intent to private antitrust litigation, 162 thereby requiring the production
of additional evidence. The uncertainty of the standard will induce
parties to introduce as much evidence as possible on the issue. Because it may mistakenly balance policy goals in many cases, an intent-based rule is not worth these added costs.
A price-fixing line would even less satisfactorily separate cases
where contribution is permitted from those where it is forbidden. A
rule granting contribution only to price-fixers would provide relief in
both of the hypothetical cases described above 163 even though contribution in the second case would be inappropriate. The rule does not
seem to reflect any of the policy goals discussed in Part II. Indeed,
one could argue that, since horizontal price-fixing is among the most
clearly anticompetitive practices forbidden by the antitrust laws, 164
the deterrent effect of barring contribution 165 is of the greatest importance when applied to this type of violation. 166 A rule granting
contribution rights to price-fixers alone is therefore likely to balance
policy goals incorrectly in many cases.
One could base a bright-line rule on many other criteria. Contribution could be allowed only against non-settling defendants, or
only where the potential contribution claims number less than ten, or
only where the case involves a practice that is already sufficiently
deterred. Each of these rules turns on one of the antitrust policy
goals relevant to the contribution controversy. But where multiple
goals must be balanced, any single bright line drawn without the
benefit of substantial experience will probably fail to reflect some of
the goals, and a mistaken balance may result in many cases. A
bright-line antitrust contribution rule, like an absolute rule, therefore
seems inappropriate.
1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d i 101, 1104-06 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 79 (1980).
162. Under present law an unintentional violator of the antitrust laws may be found liable
in a civil suit. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,436 n.13 (1978).
A private plaintiff therefore need not prove the defendant intended to violate the law to succeed in his suit.
163. See text following note 152 supra.
164. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
165. See text at notes 106-09 supra.
166. It is not obvious what antitrust policies would be furthered by drawing the line at
"price-fixing," which is essentially a conclusory term attached to any of a variety of practices
that are held to be per se illegal, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. l, 8-9 (1979). The authors of the Bayh Bill may have thought that unfairness was
especially prevalent in price-fixing cases. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 14.
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C. A Case-by-Case Contribution Rule
Under a case-by-case rule, judges base a decision to grant or
deny contribution claims on the balance of policy goals presented in
each particular case. Multiple factors, including fairness, deterrence,
settlement, and complexity of the litigation could be considered in
each case. Added costs and uncertainty result when policies must be
balanced on a case-by-case basis, but the uncertainty, at least, can be
reduced by drafting flexible guidelines for the exercise of judicial
discretion. As a common law of contribution evolves from application of the guidelines, attorneys will learn when to expect contribution rights. Several commentators favor a case-by-case antitrust
contribution rule. 167 Two considerations indicate the appropriateness of a case-by-case rule in the antitrust context.
First, because there has been so little experience with contribution in antitrust cases, any rigid rule enacted now will likely yield
mistaken results later. 168 Past experience with the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Acts shows that rigid contribution rules
strain severely under the weight of diverse cases that demand varying results. 169 A case-by-case rule avoids this pitfall because a different balance can be struck in each case. Experience may eventually
show that fears about contribution's effect on deterrence, settlements,
or complexity of litigation were unwarranted. If so, judges can become more liberal in granting contribution. Or experience may
show that contribution excessively diminishes deterrence, discourages settlements, or complicates· litigation. Should these threats be
realized, judges could withhold contribution rights except in cases of
extreme unfairness. In any event, a case-by-case rule would give
judges the flexibility they need to modify their decisions as they gain
experience with antitrust contribution claims.
A second reason to adopt a case-by-case rule is that several difficult issues within the contribution controversy - such as how to
measure contribution shares and how to handle settlements and
claim reduction - can best be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Contribution shares could be allocated among violators on a per
capita basis, or according to comparative fault, or according to each
violator's share of the sales, purchases, or profits associated with the
violation. 170 _A method of allocation appropriate in one case could
167. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 28-29, 41-42 (Supplemental Views of Senators
Metzenbaum and Kennedy); Minority Report, supra note 61, at § l; Address by Professor
Jonathan Rose, ABA Antitrust Section Meeting (Aug. 13, 1979), quoted in SENATE REPORT,
supra note 53, at 28.
168. Cf. Bok, supra note 153, at 300 (noting that the consequence of formulating merger
rules on the basis of limited knowledge is that "we are very likely to make mistakes").
169. See generally Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486 (1966).
170. A pro rata or per capita measure of contribution shares, which was mandated in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, l 182 & n.4 (8th
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produce extremely unfair results in another, 171 and courts should
therefore have the :flexibility to use different methods in different
cases. 172 Settlement and claim reduction pose an even more difficult
dilemma. Defendants may be coerced into settlement even where
they have meritorious defenses unless either (1) contribution against
settling defendants is permitted (thereby preventing coercion but simultaneously reducing defendants' incentives to settle) or (2) plaintiffs' claim against remaining defendants is reduced in the event of
settlement (thereby reducing plaintiffs' incentives to settle). Since we
are unsure how frequently a defendant is forced to abandon a meritorious defense, perhaps the best solution is to let judges fashion appropriate relief when this situation arises. 173
Until these sub-issues are resolved in a particular case, a judge
may not be able to decide whether contribution should be allowed at
all. Contribution may be appropriate if one measure of contribution
is adopted but inappropriate if a different measure is employed.
And unless a court can find some means of preserving the parties'
incentives to settle, denial of contribution may be appropriate. Because the sub-issues are best decided by looking at the facts of each
case, little additional costs are incurred by looking to the same facts
in deciding the broader issue of when to allow contribution.
Having decided that courts should have discretion to grant or
deny contribution on a case-by-case basis, 174 we should provide
guidelines for the exercise of that discretion. Otherwise, "in seeking
to be :flexible, we may simply be obscure." 175 The following guidelines seem especially appropriate, for they are based on the antitrust
Cir. 1979), would make each violator contribute equally to any final judgment. A comparative
fault measure determines contribution according to the parties' relative culpability. The trend
among the states is to allocate contribution shares on a comparative fault basis in tort cases.
See note 3 supra.
The provision in the ABA Statute is ambiguous, measuring contribution shares according
to the parties' "relative responsibility" for the damages. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§ (g).
Under that statute, percentage of sales or purchases might be used when appropriate in some
cases while relative culpability would be used when that measure is appropriate. See ADA
Report, supra note 13, at E-4.
171. A per capita measure of contribution shares is extremely inequitable where there are
only a few violators of widely varying culpability. A comparative fault rule may entail intolerable complexity in antitrust suits involving large numbers of defendants. An allocation based
on percentage of sales or purchases applies easily to a horizontal antitrust violation, but is
troublesome when applied to a vertical restraint.
172. See Sellers, supra note 2, at 852 (1979).
173. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 41-42. The relief might take the form of a
contribution claim against a settling defendant, or reduction of the plaintiffs claim, or some
combination of the two.
174. A note analyzing contribution under the securities laws similarly concluded that a
case-by-case rule was appropriate there: "The number and magnitude of unresolved questions
in this field argues strongly against the premature appearance of hard and fast rules, and
equally strongly in favor of continuing judicial flexibility in contribution claims." Note, supra
note 16, at 1314.
175. Bok, supra note 153, at 349.
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policy goals most directly affected by antitrust contribution. 176
A judge should consider the following questions when faced with
a claim for contribution:
(1)

Fairness and Settlement
A. Allocation of Loss: How great a difference is there between
the damages the defendant would pay if contribution were allowed and
if it were barred?
• B. Improper Motives: Does the plaintiff have an improper motive
in singling out the party seeking contribution for his treble damages
suit?
C. Coercion of Settlements: If contribution is denied, will this defendant realistically be forced to settle despite a reasonable probability
of a successful defense on the merits? If so, which of the following
remedies, if any, would be most likely to preserve incentives to settle?
- 1. reducing the plaintiffs claim by the amount of the settling
defendants' contribution shares.
- 2. allowing contribution claims to proceed against settling
defendants.
(2) Deterrence .
A. Is increased deterrence likely to result if contribution is denied
this type of violator?
B. If so, is increased deterrence of the illegal practice at issue desirable?
(3) Complexity of Litigation
A. To what degree will allowing contribution in this case burden
the court and the plaintiff with added litigation costs?
B. Does the plaintiff reasonably object to allowance of the contribution claim? If plaintiff objects, will severance of contribution claims
and issues under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) be feasible?

This list of questions is by no means exhaustive; courts should be
allowed to consider all the circumstances of each unique case. The
important feature of this list, or of any set of guidelines, is that it
focuses the courts' attention on the sometimes-conflicting goals of
antitrust policy.
CONCLUSION

Antitrust contribution rules may have significant effects on the
degree to which antitrust policy goals of fairness, deterrence, pretrial settlement, and simplicity of litigation are achieved. The impact
of contribution on each of these goals varies widely among the diverse cases in which contribution may be sought. Because of this
variance and our limited experience with antitrust contribution
claims, rigid rules such as those proposed by the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits, the Bayh Bill, and the ABA Statute are inappropriate. Un176. Although the guidelines listed in Professional Beauty are helpful, see note 22 supra,
the list here is tailored more precisely to the policy goals affected by antitrust contribution.
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til such time as experience reveals an absolute or bright-line rule that
would efficiently balance policy goals, district courts should have the
discretion to decide in each case whether granting or denying contribution will better promote antitrust policy.
The issues raised by antitrust contribution "rank with the most
complicated under the antitrust laws." 177 Courts have found that
complicated antitrust issues resolved in a rapid and simplistic manner often return to haunt them. 178 They can avoid repeating this
mistake in the area of antitrust contribution by adopting the case-bycase rule ~f Professional Beauty.
177. SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 28.
178. For example, a premature formulation led to trouble in the area of non-price vertical
restraints. A rigid rule that certain restraints were per se illegal, see United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), had to be retracted after experience showed the need
for greater flexibility. See Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

